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Human performance is a critical factor within organizations due to the fact that 
competitive business standards rely on efficient, effective individual workers (Gilbert, 
1978). Organizations have demanded overall improvements in performance due to 
increasing global competitiveness especially in the last few decades (Blinder, 1990).  
Organizational performance will improve once individuals improve their own 
performance, which over time will have an effect on the organization’s profitability 
(McAdams, 1996).  The ability to improve performance and maintain such improvements 
over time may well determine an organization’s success or failure (Smoot & Duncan, 
1997).  
Daniels (1989) has described practices that improve and sustain human 
performance as “performance management.”  This systematic approach relies heavily on 
performance measurement and managing performance contingencies as means to 
maximize performance.  Performance management principles suggest that in order to 
determine if a given management procedure is effective, it is important to specify both 
the behaviors and results to be affected.  Developing a way to measure these behaviors 
and results must be determined to identify the methods for changing current performance.  
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Finally, once these intervention methods are implemented, the results must be evaluated 
to assess the effects of these efforts (Daniels, 1989).  
As cited by McAdams (1996), a study of 437 companies reported on their use of 
performance management, which compared their financial performance to that of 
companies that did not use performance management.  In most cases, “companies with 
performance management programs have higher profits, better cash flow, stronger stock 
market performance, and a greater stock value than companies without performance 
management” (pp. 72-73).  Additionally, companies practicing performance management 
techniques found that productivity was also greater. 
Improving productivity in the work place has been a major focus for American 
businesses and has led companies increasingly to incentive compensation systems 
(Lawler, 1990).  Productivity alone, however, is only one reason that organizations 
implement these compensation plans.  Various incentive plans yield different results and 
organizations adopt them for different reasons (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).  An 
organization’s survival depends on whether individual contingencies support behavior 
that will ultimately lead to the achievement of the organizational objectives.  Incentive 
compensation systems can be good examples of practices that align individual and 
organizational success in that employees can be paid for production of goods and services 
that eventually lead to increased profits (Redmon & Wilk, 1991).  Unfortunately, some 
companies that turn to such incentive compensation systems do not align individual 
performances with the organization’s goals and end up paying employees based on what 
they should do rather than what they actually do.      
2 
Peach and Wren (1992) point out that the use of incentive compensation plans to 
improve employee performance dates back to our earliest records of history.  During 
much of that time, however, using incentives was not based upon objective measures.  
During and after the industrial revolution, there was an increasing demand for efficiency 
and improved human performance by U.S. factories. These demands, combined with a 
more economic rationale, led to more measurable, sophisticated incentive systems.  
Organizational behavior theory combined with the development of motivation theory has 
provided a further rationale for financial incentives.  Incentive systems have continued to 
capture the interest of many organizations as a way to increase productivity by both 
workers and managers and this interest has led to the implementation of such systems 
(Peach & Wren, 1992). 
  Interest in different pay systems has waxed and waned throughout history with 
no apparent relationship with the empirical efficacy of such systems (Dickinson & 
Gillette, 1993). Determining both the success and prevalence of certain types of incentive 
systems (e.g., profit sharing) are difficult to assess due to the fact that much of the 
evidence results from employer surveys and case studies (Sundby, Dickinson, & Michael, 
1996).  Although there has been data to support the effectiveness of alternative pay 
systems (Blinder, 1990; Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Lawler, 1990), much of this 
renewed interest can be linked to the economic realities of today’s market (Dickinson & 
Gillette, 1993). 
For example, businesses today are downsizing, streamlining, and improving 
productivity in an effort to compete with other companies (Honeywell-Johnson & 
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Dickinson, 1999).  This was documented in a study by the Hay Group in which 91% of 
the 500 medium and large American companies they surveyed reported they had 
drastically changed their organizational culture (Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999).  
Additionally, 73% recognized the need to realign their pay systems to reflect those 
changes, and 54% were already in the process of doing so (Flannery, Hofrichter, & 
Platten, 1996).  As these companies began turning away from more traditional pay 
systems, the adoption of pay for performance plans has become more prevalent. 
“In many cases, this new approach to pay is an incentive-based pay system in 
which all or part of an employee’s pay is contingent upon his or her productivity or some 
economic measure of organizational success” (Sundby et al., 1996, p. 46).  Although pay 
for performance plans differ in certain aspects, they all share one common variable in that 
employees are given bonuses, incentives, or wages based on their performance.  Pay for 
performance plans can also reward the performance of a particular group, department, or 
organization.  “Moreover, they are designed to treat compensation as a variable 
production cost, making the relationship between wages and profitability viable to 
organizational officials.  Thus, officials can control and monitor the cost as they do other 
economic indices, which helps them improve the organization” (Honeywell-Johnson & 
Dickinson, 1999, p. 91). 
Pay for performance plans have increased productivity in comparison to hourly 
pay in both applied and laboratory settings (see Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001 for a 
thorough review).  A recent meta-analysis of 45 published studies examining incentive 
pay also concluded that there is strong evidence that work performance is significantly 
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improved (an average of 22% gain) when employees are paid for exceeding objective 
goals (Stolovitch, Clark, & Condly, 2002).  Due to the success of these plans, many 
companies have started replacing or supplementing their current, traditional hourly wage 
systems with various pay for performance plans.  As cited in Frisch and Dickinson 
(1990), the American Productivity Center concluded that 75% of the 1600 organizations 
they surveyed currently had some type of pay for performance plan and, of those plans, 
80% had been implemented within the previous five years.   
Although pay for performance plans have proven to improve performance and 
increase productivity, there are several factors that should be considered regarding their 
design and implementation.  For example, Oah and Dickinson (1992) noted that 
researchers have raised questions regarding (1) how the incentives should be related to 
performance, (2) how the performance standards should be developed, (3) what the 
appropriate proportion of incentives to base pay is, (4) whether incentives are 
appropriate, and (5) how frequently incentives should be provided.  Oah and Dickinson 
(1992) examined how incentives are related to performance (the performance pay 
function) to address one of these design issues.  They concluded that productivity was 
comparable for subjects exposed to either a linear or exponential performance pay 
function, even though the exponential pay function group earned more money than the 
linear pay function group.  These results suggest that differences in the way that 
monetary incentives are related to performance may not differentially affect performance. 
Such a conclusion must be tentative because the results are from only one study and that 
study involved a laboratory-based work simulation rather than an actual work setting. 
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Additional research is needed to address this issue, as well as the above-mentioned 
questions regarding design and implementation.   
Lawler (2000) pointed out that pay for performance plans are difficult to study as 
well as to implement because they are not one-size-fits-all silver bullets.  “No single plan 
fits all organizations nor is pay for performance an accomplishable objective in all 
organizations” (p. 9).  Pay for performance should be an important component of an 
organization’s reward plan and should also reflect the strategy, structure, and 
management style. More specifically, pay for performance plans need to effectively 
translate the organization’s business strategy into measurable outcomes that align with 
the reward system.  Since it is not likely that any one particular plan will achieve all the 
objectives in the reward system, an effective pay for performance system within an 
organization is likely to have several different pay plans; for example, across 
departments, level of training, etc.  (Lawler, 2000). 
While there are several variations of alternative pay for performance plans, there 
are four basic plans that link compensation to objective financial or operational measures.  
These plans include: individual incentives, group incentives, gainsharing, and profit 
sharing (Abernathy, 2000: McAdams & Hawk, 1992).  Analyses of the defining features 
of each plan, along with the way in which these plans are linked to employee 
performance are described below. Much of the information below is based on a review of 
incentive systems by Bucklin and Dickinson (2001). 
Unlike traditional hourly or salary wage systems where employees are paid a 
fixed dollar amount for working x number of hours (e.g., base rate/salary), with 
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individual incentive systems, the amount an employee can earn in incentives is 
contingent upon the number of units of work they produce. Examples of these programs 
can be incentives either based entirely on the number of units produced (piece rate pay), 
or a base salary with the opportunity to earn additional incentives based on some 
objective organizational measure(s).  For example, with piece rate pay, one must first 
determine the value of the job at standard output (Grant, 1999).  A base rate is then 
determined for an output level that is attainable by a “normal” employee working under 
normal working conditions (i.e., standard output).  According to Grant (1999), if the base 
pay for a given job is $10 per hour, this is divided by the standard output, for example 20 
units per hour to get a piece rate; an incentive pay per unit of product or service 
produced.  In this example, the piece rate is $10 per hour divided by 20 units per hour or 
$0.50 per piece.  Other piece rate pay systems, however, provide the employee a 
guaranteed base pay with the opportunity to earn piece rate pay at volumes that exceed 
some predetermined standard output level (Grant, 1999). This allows employees to earn a 
dollar amount per hour plus additional pay once the goal is exceeded.  To read about an 
excellent example of a modern organization utilizing piece rate pay (the Lincoln Electric 
Company), see Handlin (1992).  
Bucklin and Dickinson (2001) discussed the similarity between incentive pay 
systems, on which there has been surprisingly little research, and basic schedules of 
reinforcement, on which there is a large body of basic laboratory research. “In their 
simplest form, most incentive pay systems represent ratio schedules of reinforcement 
where consequences are contingent upon the number of behaviors that are emitted” (p. 
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55).  This parallel between laboratory schedule preparations and incentive pay systems 
deployed in complex corporate environments has been observed by many behavior 
analysts, but it has also generated much critical commentary in the last decade. Dickinson 
and Poling (1996) for example, noted that incentive pay plans include many elements not 
typically present in laboratory reinforcement schedules (e.g., elaborate instructions, 
complex response sequences, conditioned reinforcers, huge delays to the scheduled 
consequence).  Even Bucklin and Dickinson’s statement quoted above is problematic.  
Incentive pay systems rarely, if ever, pay money contingent on the number of behaviors; 
they pay contingent on the quantity of results, the outcome of many behaviors. 
Despite the qualification that it is an oversimplification to identify incentive pay 
systems simply as ratio schedules of reinforcement, it is true that most incentive pay 
contingencies share a basic property with ratio schedules: how much you receive is a 
function of how much you produce. This feature differentiates ratio schedules from time-
based schedules in the laboratory, and it has been repeatedly shown that ratio schedules 
generate high levels of responding in the laboratory (Ferster & Skinner, 1957, Morse, 
1966). That relationship between performance and outcome is also typical of many 
incentive pay plans, but not of hourly pay or salary systems.  One may cautiously 
extrapolate from basic research, then, that the performance-outcome relation in incentive 
pay plans may be a critical element expected to motivate behavior that yields productive 
results. As Bucklin and Dickinson (2001) concluded, it is likely that very feature of 
incentive pay systems that is responsible for the increased performance observed under 
incentive pay compared to hourly pay systems.    
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Individual incentives are based solely on the performance of individual 
employees.  As a result, individual incentive plans provide the tightest link between 
performance and pay.  This can be attributed to the fact that (1) incentives are based on 
the employee’s own individual performance, (2) incentives are based on behaviors or 
results that have been clearly specified, (3) if the goals are met, the employee is certain to 
receive the incentive, and (4) incentives are usually paid as soon after the performance as 
possible, for example, as part of his/her paycheck (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).   
Like individual incentives, group incentives are also based on clearly specified 
goals, are certain, and distributed frequently.  Group incentives, however, rely not only 
on the individual’s performance, but also depend upon the performance of others in a 
specified group, team, or department.  Group incentives typically reward all eligible 
members of a group for their improved performance.  When members of a group are 
given incentives, the incentives are either distributed evenly across group members or 
awarded differentially according to individual contribution.  The extent to which the 
incentives are tied to individual performance depends on the size of the group and by the 
rules governing how money is to be distributed.  Although group incentive programs are 
not widely used, they have been implemented in some manufacturing industries where 
group effort is required  (Honeywell-Johnson & Johnson, 1999), and often in team-based 
organizations (Yeatts & Hyten, 1998). 
Research on both individual and group incentives has begun to accumulate over 
the past several years (Govern & Jennings, 1991; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 
1999; Jessup & Stahelski, 1999; Oah & Dickinson, 1992; Smoot & Duncan, 1997; 
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Sundby, Dickinson, & Michael, 1996).  In both laboratory and applied studies, 
individuals have consistently performed better when given individual incentives as 
compared to hourly wages (Allison, Silverstein, & Galante, 1992; Frisch & Dickinson, 
1990; George & Hopkins, 1988).  Smoot and Duncan (1997) point out “a general finding 
among these studies is that workers tend to perform at higher levels when they are paid 
for what they produce as opposed to being paid for merely showing up for work”   (p. 8). 
As cited by Bucklin and Dickinson (2001), a statistical meta-analysis published by 
Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra and Shaw (1998) found that of the 39 experimental studies 
conducted between 1960 and 1996, individual incentives were statistically correlated 
with improved performance quantity in laboratory experiments, laboratory simulations, 
and field experiments.  In applied settings, financial gains have increased as much as 15% 
to 30% while net profits have totaled $56,000 to $400,000 per year (Dickinson & 
Gillette, 1993).   
While several researchers have found group incentives to be as effective as 
individual incentives (e.g., Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999), there are data to 
support the contrary (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).  A study by Thurkow, Bailey, and 
Stamper (2000) found that individual incentives were more effective than group 
incentives in a telephone research company.  Additionally, two other studies (Dickinson 
& Honeywell-Johnson, 1999; London & Oldham, 1977) found that top performers may 
decrease their performance once they are switched from individual to group incentives. 
Gainsharing plans are another common type of incentive pay system. According 
to Bullock and Lawler (1984), gainsharing is defined as, “an organizational system of 
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employee involvement with a financial formula for distributing organization-wide gains” 
(pp. 23-24).  From 1950 to 1970, gainsharing programs expanded in scope and 
application by larger corporations (Govern, 1991).  This increase in growth is 
demonstrated by the fact that American corporations implemented nearly 600 gainsharing 
plans by 1968 (Fein, 1976). Unlike individual incentive programs, individuals 
participating in gainsharing plans generally have less influence over the rewards they 
may earn; gainsharing rewards individuals based on departmental, divisional, or 
organizational financial goals and are distributed monthly, quarterly or semiannually, or 
may be deposited into employee retirement accounts (Abernathy, 1989; Govern, 1991; 
Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999).  Because gainsharing bonuses are based on the 
aggregate performance of a large number of individuals, they are only indirectly linked to 
desired performances (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).       
The most prevalent traditional type of gainsharing program is the Scanlon Plan.  
This consists of a participation system that requires workers and managers to develop and 
evaluate ideas to improve efficiency and lower costs. This plan also includes an equity 
system which distributes monthly bonuses to employees based on the extent to which 
efficiency is attained in relation to the company’s predetermined standard (Govern, 
1991).  Improshare, another gainsharing program, excludes a formal system for employee 
participation.    According to its originator, Improshare “is a work measurement based 
plan which permits close productivity measurement in terms of output units, not 
monetary values of cost savings, to avoid the influence of monetary factors under 
changing environmental conditions” (Govern, 1991, p. 78).  Although several gainsharing 
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definitions indicate that there is always a financial bonus system to reinforce 
organizational performance, all programs do not include a system of employee 
participation to generate and evaluate cost-saving ideas (Govern, 1991).         
Like gainsharing programs, profit-sharing plans are based on the success of the 
entire organization so there is little relation between the employee’s performance and the 
amount of the bonus (Honeywell-Johnson & Johnson, 1999).  “In profit sharing, 
increased worker efforts in one department could be offset by a lack of diligence in 
others” (Peach & Wren, 1992, p. 13).  According to Lawler (1990) profit sharing plans 
are not likely to influence individual performance due to the fact that employees have 
little influence over the organization’s profitability.  Dickinson and Gillette (1993) point 
out that as the group size increases, the performance of a single individual contributes 
less and less to the overall productivity of the group.  This often results in employees 
believing that their rewards will not be significantly decreased by their own decreased 
performance.  Because all employees share in profits regardless of their contributions, a 
share of profits at the end of the year gives no incentive for maximum daily performance 
(Peach & Wren, 1992). Additionally, even if employees work hard, there is the 
possibility that, despite their efforts, the organization will not do well and no bonus will 
be given.  Even if employees assume that hard work guarantees a bonus, it is a slow and 
cumulative progression toward that bonus (Redmon & Wilk, 1991). 
The advantages of profit sharing do not appear to be related to productivity 
increases, but rather associated with: (1) making organizational costs variable, allowing 
them to fluctuate according to company profits, resulting in market share gains and 
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greater job security, (2) tying wage increases to internal measures of success rather than 
external variables, (3) educating employees on the financial condition of the company, 
and (4) advocating that cooperative effort is required for organizational success 
(Dickinson & Gillette, 1993).  Blinder (1990) also questioned whether profit sharing 
plans actually pay for themselves considering the small increases in productivity 
associated with profit sharing, and that individuals under profit sharing plans receive 
higher wages than employees who receive hourly wages.   
After reviewing profit sharing, employee stock options, and gainsharing, Blinder 
(1990) stated that although gainsharing programs may be the best, there was not enough 
evidence to support this.  There are numerous reports of successes with gainsharing 
programs as well as profit-sharing programs, but many of these reports are uncontrolled 
case studies (some reported in business magazines and trade publications) rather than 
rigorous research articles.  In fact, many reports of successes are based solely on surveys 
of corporate users rather than on objective measures of productivity.  These 
methodological problems make it difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding 
effectiveness of these programs.   
Considering the incentive systems that have been discussed thus far, it is apparent 
that individual incentive systems provide the tightest link between individual 
performance and pay.  Because of the various problems mentioned in traditional pay 
systems, Abernathy (2000) has developed an innovative pay for performance plan, the 
Total Performance System (TPS), which provides employees specific goals, with 
monthly performance reporting, and incentive payouts.  The TPS gives employees the 
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opportunity to earn incentives, in addition to their base salaries, once they have met 
and/or exceeded specified performance standards. 
The first step in developing a TPS is to develop a performance scorecard.  This is 
a format for converting multiple performance measures to a common objective rating 
scale, and then assigning weights to indicate the relative importance of the various 
measures in the scorecard.  The weights of these measures are then summed to compute a 
single performance index.  A strategic scorecard for the entire organization is then 
developed to balance short-term profitability and long-term growth.  Once designed, this 
scorecard guides the development of all the other scorecards from the top down.  
Abernathy refers to this as “cascading objectives.”  Advanced database techniques allow 
for management of performance measures for multiple employees at multiple locations.    
The amount an employee can earn in incentives under this system varies 
according to the individual organizational design of the program.  These factors include 
the level of their performance, the weight of each performance measure, and the 
predetermined percentages of the firm’s profit the organization has agreed to share with 
employees.  In Abernathy’s model, the funding for the incentive pay pool is directly 
linked to the firm’s controllable profit measures to insure that the amount of incentive 
pay available fluctuates with the firm’s financial success.  
Abernathy (2001) reviewed data from twelve companies that implemented this 
system where employees received a base salary with the opportunity to earn additional 
money in incentive pay once they met and/or exceeded their performance goals.  First, he 
examined whether the percentage of “incentive opportunity” (the maximum pay that 
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could be earned under the system) available affected performance and found no 
relationship between performance and the percentage of incentive opportunity to base 
pay for percentages that ranged from 1% to 22%.  Next, he examined the percentage of 
the actual incentive payout to base pay ranging from 1% to 33% and found that incentive 
pay affected performance trends only when incentive pay was above 20% or higher of 
base pay. This suggests that, according to this applied data, employees must receive a 
minimum of 20% of their base pay in incentive pay in order to affect performance 
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001).   Although the extent to which performance was affected 
was not mentioned, the results from these analyses can help guide organizations when 
designing monetary incentive systems. 
This thesis describes a case study at a Certified Public Accounting firm in which a 
performance pay plan similar to Abernathy’s Total Performance System was 
implemented.  The plan included a scorecard measurement system for individuals that 
could yield varying payouts twice a year. This pay for performance plan was designed by 
the company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) after a declining trend in productivity was 
observed under an existing incentive system.  Although several versions of the plan were 
designed specifically for different levels of employees, this study will focus on the 
performance of the two most junior employee levels: staff and senior accountants.  These 
levels were targeted for examination because they are the “line workers” of this 
professional service firm; they do most of the production work with few management 
responsibilities.  In addition, their pay for performance plans emphasize individual 
productivity to a larger extent than the plans for higher-level employees, so they can yield 
15 
data focusing on the relation between pay and individual productivity. The previous and 
new incentive plans will be described in detail, and the results will discuss what impact 








Participants and Organizational Setting 
 
 The study took place in a Certified Public Accounting (C.P.A.) firm in Dallas, 
Texas.  The firm employed approximately 50 - 85 employees (depending on the year) 
across 6 departments.  These departments included Tax, Audit, Accounting Services, 
Compensation & Benefits, Consulting, and Resources & Operations Management.  This 
thesis focuses on the three largest departments: Tax, Audit, and Accounting Services. The 
firm operates on a time and billing system that involves not only producing a final 
product (e.g., a tax return or financial statement), but also tracks how much billable time 
is produced compared to how much of that time is actually billed to the client.  For 
example, an employee who spends time on a given project accumulates charge hours 
according to his/her billing rate.  All full-time employees were salaried and part-time 
employees were paid an hourly wage.     
Tax services include preparation of income and all other types of tax returns and 
tax planning.  Auditing provides services to clients who maintain their own accounting 
records and request the firm to prepare financial statements.  Auditing also conducts 
independent audits of financial statements to permit an expression of an opinion on their 
fairness and conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.  Accounting 
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Services provides technical services for clients such as maintaining accounting records, 
accounts receivable or payroll processing, etc.  
Each department consists of five employee levels corresponding to the following 
job titles: staff, seniors, managers, senior managers, and partners.  Staff accountants are 
the least experienced of the five levels and also have the lowest billing rates (i.e., they 
charge clients a lower dollar amount per hour than other levels).  Level of experience and 
billing rates increase as one moves from staff to senior accountant, senior to manager, 
etc.  For example, staff accountants are given a wide variety of diversified assignments 
under the supervision of different professionals.  Seniors, however, engage in work tasks 
with minimal assistance.  They often lead one or more staff members, instruct them in 
work to be completed, review their finished products, and direct necessary revisions.  
Managers are responsible for the efficient, accurate, complete, and timely preparation of 
their own client projects as well as overseeing work done by more junior accountants.  
Advanced technical skills in a variety of tax and accounting areas, in addition to applied 
management/supervisory skills are also required.  The partner group brings in new 
business, bills clients, and comprises the top management and owners of the firm (it is a 
Limited Liability Partnership type of firm).    
Procedure 
 This study was conducted to evaluate how employee performance was affected 
after a revised performance-based pay system was implemented.  The CFO designed this 
system in May 1999 after many employees were unable to meet the established 
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performance goals of their existing system and a declining productivity trend had been 
noticed.  
 Previous incentive compensation system.  The previous incentive system was in 
place from January 1996 through April 1999.  This incentive system paid out once a year 
and was designed to pay employees, in addition to their salaries, a percentage of their 
hourly rate once they had exceeded 1800 charge hours for the year.  A charge hour 
included any time spent (down to quarter-hour increments) on a project that would 
benefit the client.  Additionally, writing an article, helping with recruiting fairs, working 
a trade show, etc. were also treated as a chargeable hour in calculating pay.  The hourly 
rate percentage increased as the number of charge hours increased.  Table 1 contains the 
charge hours and percentages from the old incentive system. 
 According to this system, an employee with an annual salary of $50,000 who 
produced 1950 charge hours would have an hourly rate of $24.04 ($50,000/2080 working 
hours in a year).  Thus, $24.04 x 1.35 (the corresponding percentage from Table 1) =  
$32.45 for each charge hour above the 1800 hour goal.  In this example, the employee 
would receive $4,867.50 ($32.45 x 150) in bonus pay.  
 New incentive compensation system.  The independent variable in this study was 
the new incentive compensation system.  This performance-based incentive system was 
implemented in May 1999.  The new plan consisted of three components: Base Pay, 
Objective Pay, and Subjective Pay.  The Base Pay was the individual’s salary; Objective 
Pay was payment based upon an individual meeting specified productivity goals.  
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Subjective Pay was bonus pay based on manager ratings of several dimensions of 
employee performance funded by group performance.            
 The Objective Pay component for staff and senior accountants was based solely 
on the amount of each employee’s charge hours relative to the charge hour goal 
established by the firm. The objective pay component for other employee levels included 
additional elements, but they are not the focus of this study.  Under the new system, 
charge hours were only those hours employees spent working on projects that benefited 
the clients.  The annual goal for each employee was 1800 charge hours, and the plan 
compensated anyone who met and/or exceeded 91% of this goal.  The 91% of goal 
threshold was intended to compensate individuals who were near the goal, and thus 
reinforce approximations to goal levels. Due to the cyclical nature of the business, the 
annual goal of 1800 hours was split between two target periods, rewarding employees 
twice a year.  The first period was from January 1st through May 31st, and the second 
period began June 1st and continued through December 31st.  Because the two time 
periods were not exactly the same, the plan began paying when charge hours exceeded 
approximately 875 target charge hours for the first period, and approximately 925 target 
charge hours in the second period (target charge hours varied across departments and 
according to the amount of work per period).  Once a threshold (91% of the goal) was 
achieved, employees became eligible to share a portion of the productivity they 
generated.  Productivity was defined as the number of charge hours multiplied by one’s 
billing rate.  The number of charge hours an employee accumulated determined the 
percentage of productivity they were eligible to earn.  The pay threshold began at 91% of 
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goal (i.e., target charge hours), and increased in specific increments as charge hours 
exceeded the goal.  See Table 2 for the percentages of productivity achieved compared to 
productivity earned. 
 Additionally, if an employee exceeded the charge hour goal at the end of the first 
target period, those charge hours became eligible for classification into a “comp bank” 
that the employee could draw from to take time off of work.  If the target charge hour 
goal was exceeded, an employee was not required to select hours for the comp bank; this 
was an alternative incentive to the cash payout. The employee could also split the hours 
and receive both time off and extra pay. Thus, on June 1st, employees selected the number 
of eligible hours (that exceeded the goal) they chose to bank as time off.  The remaining 
balance was paid out in cash at the qualifying percentages at the end of the year. 
Employees could not bank more than 80 hours and management had to approve those 
hours.  Appendix A shows a complete example of how to calculate Objective Pay and 
Comp Bank Time.   
Subjective Pay rewarded employees for performance not related to charge hours, 
yet still important to the overall success of the firm.  Subjective Pay was awarded 
annually based on performance dimensions that were judged and rated by the managers, 
senior managers, and partners using a 3-point scale.  These dimensions included 
realization, first pass accuracy and technical competencies, customer service, and going 
above and beyond activities.  Realization referred to a financial measure calculated by 
dividing what was actually billed to a client by what was considered for billing.  For 
example, if a client was billed $2500 but the actual amount of work that could have been 
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billed was $3000, this employee’s realization for that project would be 83% (work may 
be written off for various reasons; e.g., repeated customer, amount the client was quoted 
up front for a project, etc.).  First pass accuracy and technical competencies was defined 
as a project going through the review process without any errors on the first pass (e.g., 
miscalculated numbers, typos, personal information).  Customer service was based on 
producing quality products, understanding the firm’s mission and vision, and customer 
feedback.  Going above and beyond activities included writing articles for the firm, 
developing materials for continuing education within the firm, and marketing.    
The bonus pool for Subjective Pay was funded by a percentage of a given service 
area’s productivity.  The number of people who reached 91% or better of their charge 
hour goal determined the pool’s percentage.  That is, the more people within a 
department who met or exceeded the goal, the larger the percentage that would fund the 
pool.  For example, if more than half of a department met their goal, 0.75% of the 
group’s productivity would fund the pool; if less than half of the department met their 
goal, 0.50% of the group’s productivity would fund the pool.  
The managers, senior managers, and partners rated each employee on 10 items 
relating to the above performance dimensions.  These ratings were then summed so that 
each employee had a score out of a possible 100.  All of the scores from the entire 
department were then summed and each employee’s individual score was divided by the 
total group score to determine his/her percentage of productivity earned.  The percentage 
of productivity earned was then multiplied by the total dollar amount in the pool to 
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determine each employee’s individual payout amount.  See Appendix B for a complete 
example.      
Design and Data Collection 
An AB design was used to compare employee performance under the previous 
and new incentive systems.  Company records were reviewed from January 1996 through 
April 1999 and served as the source for baseline data.  This included three years of data 
that corresponded to the following dates: January through December 1996, January 
through December 1997, and May 1998 through April 1999.  After December 1997, the 
calendar year changed to that of the fiscal year and thus resulted in data collection from 
May 1998 through April 1999. In 1996, this included 6 staff and seniors from Audit, 3 
from Accounting Services, and 5 from Tax.  During 1997, there were 6 from Audit (3 of 
whom were also there in 1996 and 3 new employees), 5 from Accounting Services (3 
previously from 1996 and 2 new), and 10 from Tax (4 old and 6 new).  The final year of 
baseline from May 1998 through April 1999 included 10 from Audit (2 also there in 1997 
and 8 new), 7 from Accounting Services (1 there since 1996, 2 from 1997, and 4 new), 
and 14 from the Tax department (3 there since 1996, 4 from 1997, and 7 new). 
The new performance pay system was implemented in May 1999, and data under 
the new system was tracked through December 2001.  The data from May 1999 through 
December 1999 were not analyzed due to the fact that the new system was being 
introduced and explained to employees during this period.  Data under the new system 
included two calendar years: January through December 2000 and January through 
December 2001.  In 2000, this included 10 staff and senior accountants from Audit, 8 
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from Accounting Services, and 12 from Tax.  During 2001, this included 20 from Audit 
(6 from 2000, 14 new), 6 from Accounting Services (4 old and 2 new), and 14 from Tax 








In order to assess the effects of the new productivity-indexed pay for performance 
plan, percentages of charge hour goals attained, average charge hour totals, and 
percentages of total salaries earned in incentive pay were compared from January 1996 
through April of 1999 (baseline period), with data reviewed and analyzed under the new 
incentive system from January 2000 through December of 2001.  Due to extensive 
personnel changes over the course of the five-year period, it was difficult to assess 
individual employee performance between the baseline and intervention periods; 
therefore data were analyzed on a group basis by departments.  Data from employees 
who worked in the organization during at least one full year of the baseline period and 
continued working there through at least one full year under the new incentive system, 
however, will be examined individually.    
Percentage of Charge Hour Goal 
During the baseline period (January through December 1996; January through 
December 1997; and May 1998 through April 1999), the annual charge hour goal was 
1800 hours, and employees earned incentive pay once they met or exceeded 100% of this 
goal.  The intervention period (January through December 2000 and January through 
December 2001) also had an annual charge hour goal of 1800 hours, however this was 
split between two pay periods, and employees earned incentive pay in increasing 
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increments once they met or exceeded 91% of this goal.  In both the baseline and 
intervention periods, if an employee was not there during the entire year, his/her annual 
charge hour goal was prorated, and he/she was required to meet either ≥ 100% or ≥91% 
respectively, of that specified goal in order to earn incentive pay.  Figure 1 shows each 
department’s individual employee percentages for charge hour goals during the three 
baseline years.  Each employee is represented by a number along the x-axis and can be 
tracked across years according to their individual employee number (assigned posthoc by 
me).  Their percentage of charge hour goal met is displayed along the y-axis and was 
calculated by dividing each employee’s total number of charge hours by the charge hour 
goal (i.e., a goal of 1800 hours unless prorated).  Figure 2 displays percentages of charge 
hour goals met for each of the two pay periods for each department during 2000.  The 
same data for 2001 is displayed in Figure 3.  In these Figures, the percentage of charge 
hour goals were calculated the same as in Figure 1, however percentages are shown for 
each of the two pay periods and were divided by a charge hour goal of 875 and 925, 
respectively, unless prorated.  If an employee was there only for one period, his/her 
percentage of charge hour goal is represented for that specific period only.  Charge hour 
goals varied across employees and can be individually referenced according to employee 
numbers in Table 3.   
Table 3 tracks employees across departments from 1996 through 2001.  Each 
employee is represented by a number (as seen along the x-axes in Figures 1, 2, and 3), 
along with their charge hour goal for that year/period, their percentage of charge hour 
goal met for that period, and their percentage of salary earned in incentive pay.  It is 
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important to note that in 2000 and 2001, percentages of salaries earned in incentive pay 
are only shown in the boxes during the 2nd periods for those years unless that employee 
was only there during one of the 1st periods.  These percentages are based on total 
incentive pay earned for the year (i.e., objective and subjective pay), and because 
subjective pay was distributed only once annually, the percentages of incentive pay 
earned per period could not be broken down individually. 
Table 4 summarizes information displayed in Figures 1, 2, and 3 by listing the 
total number of employees by department for 1996 through 2001, including the 
percentages of those employees who met or exceeded 100% of the charge hour goal for 
that year.  Additionally, the percentages of employees who met or exceeded 91% of goal 
for 2000 and 2001 are also shown.  In 2000 and 2001, data are shown for the years as a 
whole and split by pay period.  It should be noted that the total number of employees 
during the split year periods tend to be higher when combined than the years as a whole 
(e.g., Audit shows 10 employees in the year 2000 as a whole, however when split by 
period, it shows 7 people in the 1st period and 8 in the 2nd period; when combined this 
equals 15 if you were to add this for a total for the year).  If an employee was there at any 
time during 2000 or 2001, he/she was counted only once for the whole year period, 
however if an employee was there during the 1st and 2nd period, he/she was included in 
total counts for both periods.    
Audit Department.  Figure 1 and Table 4 show that in 1996, six employees 
worked in the Audit Department and 67% (4/6) achieved ≥ 100% of the charge hour goal. 
However, only one of those employees who achieved goal had a full 1800-hour goal; the 
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other three employees had goals of less than 500 charge hours (refer to Table 3) 
indicating they were hired late in the year. In 1997, there were also six employees, 
however only three of these employees were also there in 1996.  In 1997, the percentage 
of employees meeting goal decreased from 67% to 50%. The three employees who 
achieved goal level performance (see Figure 1) also had extremely low charge hour goals 
because they were hired late in the year. When the calendar year changed to May of 1998 
through April of 1999, Audit employee performance decreased to its lowest baseline 
percentage ever when only 40% of the ten employees achieved ≥ 100% of the charge 
hour goal.  Of these ten employees, three were there in 1997, one in 1996, and seven 
were new.   
Ten people worked in the Audit Department from January through December 
2000, and the percentage of employees meeting goal decreased from 40% in the previous 
baseline year to 30% in 2000 who achieved ≥ 100% of the charge hour goal.  During this 
intervention period, employees earned incentive pay once they met or exceeded 91% of 
the goal, and as seen in Table 4, these percentages are also listed in addition to those 
meeting or exceeding 100% of the goal.  In the year 2000, 70% of the employees reached 
91% or better of the charge hour goal and were awarded incentive pay.  In 2001, there 
were twenty people working in Audit and the percentage of employees who met or 
exceeded 100% of goal decreased from 30% in 2000 to 20% in 2001. In 2001, only 45% 
of the employees reached 91% or more of the goal.  It should be noted that there were 14 
new hires in Audit in 2001, including 12 hired in the second half of the year.  Figure 3 
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shows that only one of these new employees (#28) exceeded 100% of the charge hour 
goal.  
Overall, there were 22 people working in the Audit Department over the three-
year baseline period and 30 during the intervention period.  These numbers include every 
employee there per year, that is, if an employee was there in 1996 and 1997, they were 
counted as two employees during that baseline period.  During baseline, an average of 
50% of the employees met or exceeded 100% of the charge hour goal.  This was 
calculated by dividing the total number of employees who met or exceeded 100% of the 
goal by the total number of employees during baseline.  During intervention, the number 
of employees reaching goal decreased from 50% during baseline to 23% who met or 
exceeded 100% of the goal; 55% met or exceeded 91% of the goal during intervention. 
By this measure (% of department achieving goals), the intervention appeared not to be 
successful in this department.   
Accounting Services Department.  In 1996, three employees worked in the 
Accounting Services Department and one of them reached ≥ 100% of the charge hour 
goal. This person (employee #37) had a prorated charge hour goal of only 218 hours (see 
Table 3). By 1997, two more employees joined the department and the percentage 
decreased to 20% when only one met 100% of the charge hour goal (employee #38 had a 
charge hour goal of only 147 hours.)  During the 1998/99 year, two employees left and 
four new employees were added to the staff.  Of these seven, the percentage continued to 
decrease from 20% in 1997 to 14% (one new employee; see Figure 2 and Table 3) who 
met or exceeded 100% of the charge hour goal.    
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From January through December 2000, there were eight employees in the 
Accounting Services Department.  The percentage of employees meeting 100% of the 
goal increased from 14% (1/7) in the previous baseline year to 50% (4/8) in 2000, with 
75% achieving ≥91% of the goal.  In 2001, there were six employees in the Accounting 
Services Department.  The percentage of employees who reached ≥100% of the goal 
decreased from 50% in 2000 to 33% (2/6) in 2001, while the percentage of employees 
achieving 91% of goal increased from 75% to 83%.  
As Table 3 indicates, Employee #49 was the only employee in Accounting 
Services who worked in the organization during both the baseline and intervention 
periods.  This employee was there the entire year in 1996 and continued working there 
through the end of 2001. The percentages of charge hour goals met decreased over the 
baseline years and were as follows: 99.98% in 1996, 95% in 1997, and 92% in 1998/99.  
During intervention, percentages increased to 93% in 2000 (i.e., 92% for the first period 
and 94% for the second), and continued to increase to 97% in 2001 (97% for the first 
period and 96% for the second). 
A total of 15 employees worked in the Accounting Services Department 
throughout the baseline period, and an average of 20% of these employees met or 
exceeded 100% of the charge hour goal.  These percentages were calculated the same as 
they were in the Audit Department.  During the entire intervention period, there were 14 
employees and the percentage of employees meeting or exceeding 100% of goal 
increased from only 20% during baseline to 43% during intervention, while 79% met or 
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exceeded 91% of the goal during intervention.  By this measure, the intervention 
appeared to improve performance relative to baseline in this department.   
Tax Department.  In 1996, the Tax Department was at its highest percentage ever, 
when 100% of the five employees achieved ≥100% of the charge hour goal (see Table 4 
and Figure 1). This is tempered by the fact that only one of these five employees had a 
full 1800-hour goal (employee #57; see Table 3). In 1997, four employees continued 
working there, one employee left, and six were added.  Of the ten employees working 
there in 1997, the percentage of employees meeting or exceeding 100% of goal decreased 
to 70%.  During the 1998/99 year, three employees left, seven remained, and six were 
added.  Of these thirteen employees, the percentage that achieved ≥100% of the charge 
hour goal continued to decrease even more from 70% to 31% (4/13).   
From January through December of 2000, 12 people worked in the Tax 
Department.  Percentage of employees meeting or exceeding goal increased from 31% 
during the last year of baseline to 58% who met or exceeded 100% of the goal, with 83% 
meeting or exceeding 91% of the goal (see Table 4 and Figure 2).  In 2001, 14 people 
worked in Tax (6 of whom were new hires), and only 7% (1/14) met or exceeded 100% 
of the goal while only 36% met or exceeded 91% of the goal. Interestingly, Figure 3 
shows that six 2001 employees produced nearly uniform performance levels (just over 
100% of goal level) in the first half of the year.       
As shown in Table 3, four employees in Tax were there during at least one full 
year of baseline and one full year during the intervention period.  Employee #58 began 
working there in 1997, however this employee’s first full year was during the 1998/99 
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period.  Percentages of charge hour goals met were as follows: 92% in 1998/99, then the 
percentage increased to 98% in 2000 (106% for the first period and 91% for the second), 
and finally decreased to 88% in 2001 (102% for the first period and 75% for the second).  
Employee #59 and #61 were also there in 1997 with their first full year of baseline in 
1998/99.  In 1998/99, the percentages of charge hour goals met for #59 were 113%, then 
decreased to 109% in 2000 (109% for the first period and 108% in the second), and 
finally, dropped to 95% in 2001 (101% in the first period and 90% in the second).  For 
employee #61, percentages of charge hour goals were 105% in 1998/99, decreased to 
98% in 2000 (92% for the first period and 103% for the second), and then stayed at 98% 
in 2001 (101% and 94%).  Employee #70 began working in the organization in 1996, 
completing the first full year of baseline in 1997.  In 1997, the percentages of charge hour 
goals met were 103%, increased to 109% in 1998/99, decreased to 93% in 2000 (103% 
for the first period and 84% for the second), and decreased again to 92% in 2001 (102% 
and 82%). 
Throughout the baseline period, 28 people worked in the Tax Department and an 
average of 57% met or exceeded 100% of the charge hour goal.  During intervention, 26 
employees worked in Tax and the percentage who achieved ≥100% of the goal decreased 
from 57% during baseline to only 31%, while an average of 58% achieved 91% or better 
of the goal.  By this measure, the intervention did not appear successful for this 




Split Year Payout Periods 
 During 2000 and 2001, the 1800 charge hour goal was split between two pay 
periods: January 1st through May 31st, and June 1st through December 31st.  In the Audit 
and Tax Departments, the charge hour goal was 875 for the first half and 925 for the 
second half, and for Accounting Services it was 800 and 1000 hours.  In both 2000 and 
2001, all departments, excluding Accounting Services in 2000, showed a decrease from 
the first period to the second period in the percentages of employees who met or 
exceeded both 91% and 100% of the charge hour goal.     
 Audit Department.  Table 4 shows that in 2000, 71% of Audit employees met or 
exceeded 100% of the goal in the first half, while only 38% of them met goal in the 
second half.  The percentage of employees meeting or exceeding 91% of the goal in 2000 
decreased from 86% in the first half to 50% in the second.  In 2001, 50% of the 
employees achieved ≥100% of the goal in the first half of the year (down from 71% in 
2000).  During the second half of 2001, the percentage of employees performing above 
100% of goal level decreased to 22%.  In the first half of 2001, 88% of employees met or 
exceeded 91% of the goal; during the second half of 2001, that percentage decreased to  
33%.  
 Accounting Services Department.  In Accounting Services, 50% of the employees 
achieved ≥100% of the goal in 2000 for the first half, and 60% of the employees did so in 
the second half.  In 2000, 67% of the employees met or exceeded 91% of the goal during 
the first half, and 100% of them did so in the second period.  In 2001, 75% of the 
employees (the highest ever) met or exceeded 100% of the goal in the first period while 
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only 20% did so in the second half.  One hundred percent of the employees achieved 
≥91% of the goal in the first half of 2001, but only 60% of the employees attained this 
level in the second pay period. 
 Tax Department.  In 2000, 82% of the employees in Tax met or exceeded 100% 
of the goal in the first half, but only 38% met the goal during the second half.  
Additionally, 91% of the employees reached 91% or better of the goal in the first half, 
and 63% of them did so in the second half of the year.  In 2001, the percentage of 
employees who met or exceeded 100% of the goal decreased to 70% in the first half of 
the year. By the second half of 2001, that percentage dropped to 0%.  Also in 2001, 70% 
of employees met or exceeded 91% of the goal in the first half whereas only 15% met or 
exceeded that charge hour level in the second half of the year. 
Production Data of Employees with Full Workloads 
 Percentages of charge hour goals were shown in Figures 1-3 and summarized with 
a department-wide statistic in Table 4 for all employees between 1996 and 2001 
regardless of their annual charge hour goals.  These data therefore did not distinguish 
between employees with full annual workloads and those with less than full workloads. 
Employees with less than 1800-hour goals included new hires and may have been 
different in important ways from employees who had full annual workloads.  At the very 
least, employees with less than full workloads had less exposure to the contingencies of 
the performance pay plan by virtue of working at the firm for less time. The inclusion of 
employees with less than full workloads was necessary to give an overall picture of 
department performance, but their data can make it more difficult to determine the effect 
 34
of exposure to the intervention contingencies.  When there was considerable growth or 
turnover within a department, as there was especially in the Audit and Tax departments 
during the intervention years, the percentage measures shown in Table 4 may not give the 
clearest picture of the effects of the intervention because that measure is confounded by 
the inclusion of so many new people hired at different points throughout the calendar 
year. By looking at actual charge hour production of those staff and senior accountants 
who worked the entire year and were assigned full annual workloads, a clearer 
comparison can be made between the baseline and intervention phases and across 
departments. 
 Figure 4 shows the average number of charge hours worked for each department 
from 1996 to 2001 for those employees who had an annual charge hour goal of 1800. 
Each department is displayed along the x-axis and the average number of charge hours is 
shown on the y-axis.  Each year is represented by a different color.  
 Audit Department.  In Audit in 1996, there were three employees with an annual 
charge hour goal of 1800 hours.  The average charge hour production of these three 
employees was 1824 charge hours.  This was calculated by adding the total number of 
charge hours for the three employees and dividing by three.  In 1997, there were three 
employees with a goal of 1800 and the average production fell from 1824 hours to 1659 
hours.  By the 1998/99 year, only two employees had an annual goal of 1800 hours and 
average hours decreased from 1659 to 1588 hours.  In 2000, the first year of intervention, 
there were four employees with an annual goal of 1800 hours.  The number of charge 
hours increased from 1588 in the last year of baseline to 1786 hours in 2000 (a gain of 
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over 12%).  During 2001, there were five full workload employees, and the average 
increased to 1800 hours, the highest level since the first year of baseline.  Overall, for 
those in Audit with an annual charge hour goal of 1800 hours, production averaged 1703 
hours during baseline, and 1794 hours (within 99% of goal) during intervention. By this 
measure, then, the intervention appeared successful in improving performance nearer to 
goal levels for employees with full workloads in this department.    
 Accounting Services Department.  In Accounting Services in 1996, there was 
only one employee with an annual goal of 1800 hours and this employee worked 1799.7 
charge hours.  In 1997, there were three employees with this goal and the average 
decreased to 1719 hours.  By 1998/99, there were three employees with a goal of 1800 
hours and the average decreased from 1719 hours to 1621 hours.  In 2000, there were also 
three employees and the average number of charge hours increased to 1791 charge hours 
(a gain of over 10%.)  During 2001, the number of hours decreased slightly to 1779 
hours.  Overall, full workload employees in Accounting Services averaged 1701 hours 
during baseline and improved to 1785 hours (within 99% of goal) during intervention.    
 Tax Department.  There was only one employee in Tax with an annual charge 
hour goal of 1800 hours in 1996, and this employee worked 2146 charge hours.  In 1997, 
there were five employees with this goal and they averaged 1781 charge hours.  During 
the 1998/99 year, there were eight employees and the number of charge hours decreased 
from 1781 in the previous year to 1750 hours.  In the first year of intervention in 2000, 
there were five full workload employees and they averaged 1806 hours (a gain of 3%.)  
By 2001, there were eight employees and the number of charge hours decreased from 
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1806 in 2000 to only 1617 in 2001.  For the entire baseline period, the full workload 
employees of the Tax Department averaged 1789 charge hours.  For the intervention 
period, the average number of charge hours for those with an annual goal of 1800 hours 
decreased to 1690 due to the large decrease in the second year of the intervention.   
Percentage of Salary Earned in Incentive Pay 
   Percentage of salary earned in incentive pay was calculated for the baseline and 
intervention periods.  Because the 1998/99 period of intervention lasted over two 
different calendar years, percentage of salary earned in incentive pay was not calculated 
for this period because there were different salaries in 1998 to 1999.  Percentage of salary 
earned in incentives was calculated for the baseline period (1996 and 1997) as a whole 
and for the intervention period (2000 and 2001). 
 It should be noted that incentive pay was awarded in 2000 and 2001 once 
employees met or exceeded 91% of the goal, compared with 1996 and 1997 when 
employees were only awarded incentive pay once they met or exceeded 100% of the 
goal.  Differences in these percentages affect the total percentages earned in incentive pay 
for 2000 and 2001, therefore a comparison of those meeting or exceeding 100% of goal 
in 2000 and 2001 will also be discussed.  
 During baseline, 33% (4/12) of the twelve employees in Audit earned incentive 
pay and those four employees earned an average of 12.4% of their salaries.  This was 
calculated by dividing the total dollar amount of incentive pay by the total dollar amount 
of salaries for those earning incentives, and then multiplying by 100. Some employees 
exceeded their charge hour goals but were not eligible for incentive pay because they 
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were hired so late in the year (and thus had very low charge hour goals.) In Audit in 2000 
and 2001 (the intervention period), 50% of the thirty employees received, on average, 
5.1% of their salaries when calculated for all employees who met or exceeded 91% or 
better of the goal.  The five people (17%) in Audit who met or exceeded 100% of goal 
and earned incentive pay during the intervention earned an average of 11.8% of their 
salaries.   
During baseline in Accounting Services, 25% (2/8) of the employees earned 
incentives averaging 25.6% of their salaries. This measure was skewed because the two 
employees had charge hour goals of 218 hours, just high enough to be eligible for 
incentive pay but low enough to be easily attainable. No employee with a full workload 
earned incentive pay during baseline. During intervention, 71% (10/14) of the employees 
earned incentives averaging 5.7% of their salaries for all of those at or above 91% of 
goal.  The four employees at or above 100% of goal in Accounting Services earned an 
average of 7.9% of their salaries during intervention.   
In the Tax department, 73% (11/15) of the employees earned incentive pay during 
baseline, averaging 9.5% of their salaries.  During intervention, 69% (18/26) of the 
employees earned incentive pay, and they earned an average of 9.1% of their salaries.  
Five people in Tax met or exceeded 100% of goal and earned incentive pay during the 
intervention. The percentage of salary earned increased from 9.5% during baseline to 
11.9% during intervention for those people exceeding 100% of goal level.   
 To summarize, a greater proportion of people in 2/3 departments (Audit and 
Accounting Services) earned some incentive money under the revised pay for 
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performance plan than under the old plan.  This was due to a lower threshold for 
incentive payout (91% instead of 100% of goal) during the intervention years.  Because 
the amount paid out was small between 91% of goal and 100% of goal, the amount of 
money earned in incentives was a smaller percentage of employee salary.  For people 
who exceeded 100% of goal level, the amount of incentive pay as a percent of salary was 
comparable during baseline and intervention.  
Firmwide Performance 
 The firm’s profit and loss statements and income statements were examined to see 
how the firm’s finances changed during the baseline and intervention years.  At this 
aggregated level of analysis, one can see only general trends and it is more difficult to 
attribute observed changes to any one variable such as the new incentive pay plan.  One 
can determine, however, whether the firm faired better or worse when the revised plan 
was in effect.  Realization data may be important in this regard.  Realization is the 
proportion of money billed to clients relative to the monetary value of the charge hours of 
work accumulated on client jobs (technically, net fees/gross fees).  Realization was a 
small factor on the subjective portion of the staff and senior accountant’s pay plan, and it 
was a larger part of the plan for managers and senior managers.  Firmwide, realization 
averaged 88.2% in 1996, 88.5% in 1997, the two calendar baseline years.  Realization 
was higher during the intervention years: 95.7% in 2000 and 93.8% in 2001.  This means 
that more of the work done by employees was billed to the clients during the intervention 










Productivity data showed a clear decreasing trend across the three baseline years 
for all departments, both in the percentage of employees reaching the goal and in the 
average number of charge hours for those employees with full annual workloads.  It is not 
clear why productivity was trending downward across the baseline years.  The firm’s 
CFO felt that the existing incentive system was not strong enough to continue to motivate 
performance, especially as the firm grew, because payouts occurred so late in they year 
(whenever people exceeded the annual charge hour goal) and those payout dates were far 
removed from the “busy season” for Tax and Audit personnel.  As the firm continued to 
grow, the CFO and the Partners attempted to restore and maintain high productivity by 
implementing the new pay for performance plan. One feature of the new plan was that 
incentive pay would be available twice in the year, with one payout scheduled in June 
shortly after the busy season. 
During the first full year of intervention in 2000, the Accounting Services and Tax 
departments showed an improvement from the last baseline year in the percentage of 
employees reaching 100% of goal.  In 2001, the percentage of employees attaining goals 
decreased, suggesting that the new plan lost its effectiveness in the second year. 
However, the weakness in this measure is that the addition of new employees can lower 
the overall department productivity, possibly obscuring the effect of the incentive plan on 
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employees with more tenure. The new employees are possibly less skilled, and therefore 
unable to be as productive as more experienced employees. New hires also necessarily 
have less contact with the incentive contingencies than do employees with longer tenures.  
Perhaps a clearer picture of the effects of the performance pay plan on 
productivity, not confounded by new people with less than a full workload, is given by 
the data on average number of charge hours for employees with 1800-hour workloads 
(this was shown in Figure 4).  When examining average productivity data for those 
employees, all three departments improved from baseline in 2000. In fact, average charge 
hour production across all three departments approached or exceeded 100% of the goal 
level in 2000.  Productivity in 2001 for Audit and Accounting Services staff and seniors 
remained above the level seen in the last two years of baseline.  These data suggest that 
the performance pay plan does contribute to higher productivity by boosting the 
performance of employees with full workloads.  The productivity of the Tax 
department’s full workload employees, however, decreased substantially in 2001. The 
data from the Tax department suggest that there are flaws in the plan or that other 
variables can negate the positive effects of the plan. 
What caused the deterioration in performance seen in the Tax department in 
2001?  Data from the split payout periods (Table 3) can help explain why overall annual 
productivity slumped in the Tax department, and to a lesser degree in the Audit 
department.  The data showed a strong first half-second half differential in productivity 
with Audit and Tax. That is bound to occur to some degree in these departments due to 
the cyclical nature of the business where the majority of auditing and tax work is 
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processed in the first half of the year and there is much less work during the second half.  
But the differential widens in 2001 for the Tax department; no one attained 100% of the 
charge hour goal in the second half of the year.    
Data on the percentage of employees attaining goal level (Table 3) were 
undoubtedly lowered by the addition of four new hires in the second half of 2001, none 
of whom attained goal levels. However, the productivity decrease in 2001 is observed 
even among full workload employees so it is not simply an artifact due to the inclusion of 
data from low performing new hires. It may be that the design of the payouts in the plan 
carried a flaw that affected some employees more than others.  Under this plan, 
employees were paid on June 1st once they met or exceeded 91% of the charge hour goal 
for their performance during the first half of the year.  They could bank some of these 
dollars in time off which, if not taken, could be converted back to cash paid out on 
December 31st, when they also received any incentive pay for their second half 
productivity as well as any money for the subjective performance measures for the entire 
year.  Employees could meet goal for the first half of the year when work was plentiful, 
fail to meet goal in the second half, and still receive some incentive pay in June and at the 
end of the year regardless of their productivity in the second half.   
The effects of a dispute over pay in the Tax department may have contributed to 
this problem. A number of employees in Tax resisted the new pay for performance plan 
because they had wanted straight time-and-a-half overtime pay based on the number of 
hours they worked rather than pay based on their productivity.  These employees may 
have discovered the abovementioned weakness in the plan and taken advantage of it.  In 
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this regard, it may not be coincidence that six Tax employees achieved just over 100% 
goal level in the first half (guaranteeing them substantial incentive pay) before slumping 
in the second half (this was visible in Figure 3.)  
Other changes in the organization can counteract the motivational effects of the 
performance pay plan. The success of the performance pay plan is highly dependent on 
the opportunity to increase one’s productivity. If too many new people are hired 
(regardless of their skills) without a concomitant increase in business, the department will 
become staffed at a level over capacity.  In an overcapacity situation, there would not be 
enough work for all staff and seniors to do, thereby preventing some or all of the 
employees from maximizing their productivity. When this happens, work is generally 
allocated to the most experienced employees, who may be able to attain goal levels of 
production if the amount of work available is sufficient for that.  If the available work 
remains too low, the motivational properties of the incentive pay plan will be lost because 
the goals will be unattainable and degrees of extinction may occur.   
Such a scenario may have occurred in 2001 when the firm merged in employees 
from another firm and the amount of client work anticipated by the merger did not pan 
out (fewer clients followed the Partner from the old firm to the firm under study.) 
Sustained overcapacity may demoralize employees and make them resentful toward the 
incentive pay plan.  There are several possible solutions to this problem. Some employees 
could be fired to reduce the overcapacity, although this is the least satisfactory solution. 
Efforts can be made to find new clients or extract more work from existing clients. 
Adjustments also could be made to goal levels in the performance pay plan to make them 
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fit the amount of work available. In any case, the ability of any performance pay plan to 
encourage and reinforce high productivity is inherently limited by the amount of work 
available to do. Overcapacity issues must be resolved for performance pay plans to work 
well.    
The payout thresholds also may have caused an unintended problem with the 
plan. Small payouts were available starting at 91% of charge hour goals with much larger 
ones for performance above 100% of goal.  This was intended to reinforce 
approximations to the 1800-hour goal, but it may have fostered the impression that 91% 
of 1800 was the de facto goal, causing employees to be satisfied producing just over that 
threshold and keeping them from striving for the full 1800 charge hours. There were 
anecdotal reports that some managers put too much emphasis on attaining 91% of goal 
instead of emphasizing the full 1800- hour goal when they explained the plan to their 
staff and seniors. To the extent this was true, the lesson would be that any and all 
communications regarding the plan should be monitored for inaccuracies if the plan is to 
work as designed. 
The implementation of the new incentive system may have produced other 
positive effects on the firm beyond the effect on charge hour productivity of staff and 
seniors.  Realization was higher during the intervention years than in the first two 
baseline years. The increase in realization can indicate that a greater proportion of charge 
hours produced were considered “good work” and thus justifiably billed to the clients 
during the intervention years. Realization was a small part of the subjective portion of the 
scorecards for staff and seniors, but it was a more important part of the managers’, senior 
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managers’, and partners’ scorecards.  Managers and above could directly improve 
realization by billing clients more and writing off less work.  This suggests that elements 
of the multilevel performance pay plan may have worked even better on dimensions of 
performance other than productivity at higher levels in the firm.   
It is possible that managers and above put pressure on staff and seniors to do 
better work to increase realization.  If this were true, this would indicate that the increase 
in productivity consisted of high quality, billable work.  On the other hand, it is also 
possible that less work was written off regardless of the quality; that is, that excess 
unnecessary hours were included in the final bill to the client simply to boost realization 
percentages. If that were the case, the firm would benefit financially, but it would not be 
attributable to high quality work, a risky business proposition for the long term.  No data 
were available to determine which of these scenarios occurred.        
For 2002, modifications of the pay for performance plan were made to address 
some of the weaknesses observed in the first two years.  Under the 2002 revision, first 
half payouts were limited so that employees could only receive 60% of their productivity 
once they met or exceeded 91% of the goal.  The remaining 40% of incentive pay was 
held back and only paid out in December if they exceeded the annual charge hour goal.  
The revision should encourage employees to maintain productivity across both payout 
periods.  To support this further, the dollar amount of incentive pay has been adjusted so 
that more money will be paid out for achieving the 1800-hour goal.  Results from this 
revision should be analyzed in future research to determine whether these adjustments 
improved performance.   
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Data from this thesis addresses issues raised by previous studies. Oah and 
Dickinson (1992) pointed out that one of the questions raised by researchers is what the 
appropriate proportion of incentives to base pay should be. Abernathy (2000) reviewed 
data from several of his client companies that implemented a pay for performance plan 
and found that incentive pay affected performance trends only when incentive pay was at 
20% or above of base pay. The present analysis found that employees received, on 
average, between 5% and 12% of their base salaries in incentive pay and yet productivity 
improvement was observed in many cases.  Of course, it is possible that higher incentive 
pay amounts would have generated greater productivity.  This contention may be 
examined when data are examined from the 2002 revision, which pays out higher 
amounts at the 100% of goal threshold than the plan in effect during 2000 and 2001. 
This thesis adds to the case study literature on the effects of incentive based pay 
plans in organizations. Outside of laboratory simulations, no pay for performance plan is 
implemented in an unchanging organization, so it is difficult to isolate the effects due to 
the presence of multiple confounding variables.  This was true in the firm under study 
here. For example, the author was involved in coaching the manager of the Accounting 
Services Department in 2000 to focus on performance improvement techniques.  In 
addition, a behavior-based management consulting firm conducted extensive training on 
principles of behavior and performance improvement for managers and above in 2000.  
Furthermore, the many changes in personnel due to hiring, firings, promotions, and 
mergers mean that one is studying the effects of intervention variables on a constantly 
changing population. It is perhaps best to acknowledge that the analysis of performance 
 47 
pay plans in real world organizations will be inevitably confounded, and that any 
conclusions drawn regarding effectiveness must be regarded as statements about the 
interaction of the performance contingencies in the plan and other ongoing or changing 











EXAMPLE OF HOW TO CALCULATE OBJECTIVE PAY UNDER THE NEW PAY 












Components for calculating share of Objective Pay and Comp Bank: 
1. Billing Rate 
2. Actual Charge Hours 
3. Target Charge Hours 
 
To determine Comp Bank on June 1st: 
 
4. Target Charge Hours x 91% = Comp Bank Target 
5. Actual Charge Hours minus Comp Bank Target = Hours available for Comp Bank 
6. Select number of hours to be taken as time off  
 
To determine Payout: 
 
7. Actual Charge Hours / Target Charge Hours = Percentage of Achievement  
8. Using Table 1, determine corresponding Share of Productivity Earned 
9. Multiply Charge Hours by Billing Rate = Productivity 




1. Billing Rate = $85.00 
2. Actual Charge Hours = 933.00 
3. Target Charge Hours = 867.00 
 
 
4. 867 x .91 = 789 Comp Bank Target 
5. 933 – 789 = 144 hours available for Comp Bank, however 80 hours is the max 
6. Select number of hours to bank as time off = 60 hours 
7. 933 / 867 = 108% (Percentage of Achievement) 
8. 108% of Achievement = 2.50% Share of Productivity Earned 
9. 933.00 x $85.00 = $79,305 (Productivity) 
10. 2.50% x $79,305 = $1982.63 
11. $1982.63 / 144 = $13.7682 Available payout per hour 
12. $13.7682 x 84 (144 hours available minus 60 banked hours) = $1,156.53   




































Dimensions for Subjective Pay: 
 
1. Realization (what was actually billed divided by what was considered for billing) 
2. First pass accuracy and technical competencies 
3. Customer Service 
4. Above and beyond activities 
 
Rating scale scores for 10 items relating to Subjective Pay performance dimensions: 
 
1 = Needs greater improvement or participation 
5 = Meets expectations and warrants recognition 
10 = Exceeds expectations and warrants significant recognition 
 
• Each employee earns a score on a rating sheet using the above dimensions; there is a 
maximum score of up to 100 points 
• The entire service area’s points are then totaled, and each employee’s individual score 
is divided by the total service area’s score to equal the percentage of Subjective Pay 
earned 
 
Example of how Subjective Pay pool is funded: 
 
Department X has 8 employees 
 









       TOTAL $1,110,500 
 
If 5 of these 8 employees met or exceeded the charge hour goal, then: 
 
$1,110,500 (total department’s productivity) x .75% (percentage used since more than 








Example of how each employee is paid their portion of Subjective Pay: 
 









DEPARTMENT        426 
   TOTAL    
 
1. Divide the employee’s score by total score = percentage of pool earned 
2. Multiply percentage of pool earned by the total amount in pool 
 
For example, Employee 1 would earn: 
 
1. 50/426 = 0.117 







































Previous Incentive System 
 











































New Incentive System 
 
Percent of Productivity Achieved 
 
Share of Productivity Earned 
91% - 95% 0.25% 
96% - 100% 0.50% 
101% - 105% 2.00% 
106% - 110% 2.50% 
111% - 115% 3.0% 
116% - 120% 3.5% 













1st 2001 2nd 
2001 
1.                                CHG   
                             % of Goal 







     
2.                                CHG   
                             % of Goal 




     
3                                 CHG  
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 














4.                                CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
  1409 
102 
NA 
    
5.                                CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 











6.                                CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      133 
51 
- 
7.                                 CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
  1136 
106 
NA 
    
8.                                 CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 










9.                                 CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      690 
77 
- 
10.                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      775 
94 
- 
11.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 





12.                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
  1691 
84 
NA 
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13.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 




14.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 




      
15.                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      527 
60 
- 
16.                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 







     
17.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      162 
58 
- 
18.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      359 
69 
- 
19.                              CHG   
                            % of Goal 
                                  % of Salary 










20.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      534 
88 
- 
21.                             CHG   
                            % of Goal 
                                  % of Salary 






   
22.                              CHG   
                            % of Goal 
                                  % of Salary 







23.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 








24.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      601 
59 
- 
25.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      162 
63 
- 
26.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 








Table 3 continued27.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 




28.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      775 
101 
- 
29.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 









30.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
  665 
86 
NA 
    
31.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 










    
32.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      231 
28 
- 
33.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 




      
34.                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 










   
35.                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      745 
82 
- 
36.                              CHG               
                             % of Goal 











37.    
   
         
38.    
   
         
39.    
   
         
40.    
   
         
41.    
   
         
42.    
   
         
43.    
   
         
44.    
   
         
45.    
   
         
46.    
   
         
47.    
   
         
48.    
   
         
49.    
   
         Table 3 continuedAccounting Services Department 
 




1st 2001 2nd 
2001 
                          CHG               
                          % of Goal 







     
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 







    
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 






   
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 
   800 
103 
5.2 
   
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 







     
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 




                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 
  1548 
86 
NA 
    
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 







    
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 
      410 
89 
- 
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 






   
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 











                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 













                          CHG   
                         % of Goal 






















Table 3 continued50.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 







51.                              CHG   
                              % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 






52.    
   
         
53.    
   
         
54.    
   
         
55.    
   
         
56.    
   
         
57.    
   
         
58.    
   
         
59.    
   
         
60.    
   
         
61.    
   
         
62.    
   
         
63.    
   
         
64.    
   
         Table 3 continuedTax Department 
 




1st 2001 2nd 
2001 
                          CHG               
                          % of Goal 










   
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 
      692 
55 
- 
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 








                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 













                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
                          % of Salary 






                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 










    
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
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                          % of Goal 

















                           CHG   
                          % of Goal 










    
                          CHG   
                          % of Goal 
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                         % of Goal 




     
                          CHG   
                         % of Goal 




     
                          CHG   
                        % of Goal 
                        % of Salary 















Table 3 continued65.                             CHG   
                            % of Goal 
                                  % of Salary 






   
66.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 










67.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 






68.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 




      
69.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
  1347 
84 
NA 
    
70.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 




















71.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
   750 
101 
10.2 
   
72                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 





73.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      618 
96 
- 
74.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      925 
74 
- 
75.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
      618 
76 
- 
76.                              CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
  1039 
96 
NA 
    
77.                               CHG   
                             % of Goal 







     
78                                CHG   
                             % of Goal 
                                   % of Salary 
  1247 
87 
NA 




Table 3 Key 
 
1. CHG – Charge hour goal; target was prorated if employee was there for partial year 
 
2. % of Goal – Calculated by dividing the charge hour target by the actual number of 
charge hours worked  
 
3. % of Salary – Calculated by dividing the employee’s base salary by the total dollar 
amount he earned in incentive pay 
 
4. A dash (-) indicates that no incentive pay was awarded 
 
Note: % of Salary was only calculated for the entire year for both 2000 and 2001. 
Therefore, this amount is displayed under the 2nd 2000/2001 heading, unless employee 














1996 1997 1998 – 1999 















Audit 6 67% Audit 6 50% Audit 10 40% 
ACS 3 33% ACS 5 20% ACS 7 14% 




Dept. # of 
Employees 
% of 













Audit 10 70% 30% Audit 20 45% 20% 
ACS 8 75% 50% ACS 6 83% 33% 





Split By Payout Period 
 
2000 
01/01/00 – 05/31/00 06/01/00 – 12/31/00 
















Audit 7 86% 71% Audit 8 50% 38% 
ACS 6 67% 50% ACS 5 100% 60% 




01/01/01 – 05/31/01 06/01/01 – 12/31/01 
















Audit 8 88% 50% Audit 18 33% 22% 
ACS 4 100% 75% ACS 5 60% 20% 



















































































Percentage of charge hour goal met for each employee 
in the Audit department (top), Accounting Services 


















































































Figure 2. Percentage of charge hour goal met for each period in 
               the Audit department (top), Accounting Services (middle), 

















































































Figure 3. Percentage of charge hour goal met for each period in
               the Audit department (top), Accounting Services 
               (middle), and Tax (bottom).
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Figure 4. Average number of charge hours per year for employees with full annual 
                workloads in the Audit department (left), Accounting Services (middle), 
                and Tax (right).
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